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This paper uses data on abortion rates, by state and year from 1974-88, to estimate two-
stage least squares models with fixed state and year effects. The results indicate that
implementing restrictions on Medicaid funding for abortion results in lower aggregate abortion
rates in-state and higher abortion rates among nearbystates, suggestingone of the main effects
of these policies is to induce cross-state migration for abortion services. The effect of these
restrictions on actual abortions among state residents is much smalIer a maximal estimate
suggests that 22 percent of the abortions among low-income women that are publiclyfunded do
not take place after funding is eliminated. We also have substantial evidence that a larger
number of abortion providers in a state increases the abortion rate within the state, primarily
through inducing cross-state migration, with nonhospital providers being particularly important
Political affiliation variables have mixed effects and are difficult to interpret Controlling for
state fixed effects, the effect of changes in demographic and economic variables over time is
typically small, although a rise in unemployment has consistently positive effects on abortion
rates.
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Abortionrates rose rapidly in this country after the 1973 Supreme Court
ruled in Row v.Wade thatthe constitutional right to privacy includes the right
of pregnant women to have an abortion. Abortion rates peaked in 1981, and
have fallen somewhat in the years since then. At least part of this decline has
been attributed to concerted efforts to limit the availability of abortion through
public policies, such as restrictions on public finding of abortion or parental
consent laws. Others have attributed the decline to the decreasing availability
of abortion providers in many areas, often linked to public protests aimed at
abortion providers in many cities. Others point to changing demographic
factors. Despite very heated public discussion, however, the research on the
determinants of abortion rates is limited.
This paper investigates the impact of public policy, provider availability,
the political environment, and demographic and economic factors on the
determinants of state abortion rates between 1974 and 1988. As noted below,
most previous work has focused on cross-sectional estimates of state abortion
rates. In contrast, we have 13 years of data for 51states) This data set
allows us to look at the impact on abortion rates of changes in explanatory
variables over time within a state, controlling for underlying state-specific
fixed effects. Panel data analysis provides much more accurate estimates of
the impact of changes over time in policy or in environmental factors on
abortion usage.
Our primary results are summarized here:
1fl District ot Columbia is included along with the 50 states.
12
(1) The implementation of restrictions on medicaid funding are
correlated with a 14 percent decline in in-state abortion rates. Actual abortion
rates among state residents decline only 5percent,indicating that the
implementation of these laws leads to substantial cross-state migration for
abortions. There appear to be strong correlations with the passage of medicaid
funding restrictions and changes in behavior and attitudes within states among
all women. This is most clearly apparent in the fact that even enacted but
unenforced laws are correlated with lower in-state abortion rates. A maximal
estimate of the impact of these laws on abortions among medicaid-eligible
women is that 22 percent of the abortions that would otherwise occur do not
take place when publicfundingis limited.
(2) There is clear evidence in this study of the cross-migration of
women between states for an abortion, consistent with Tiebout-type theories
about movements across competing jurisdictions. This cross-migration is
predominantly correlated with changes in medicaid funding laws, including
both own-state and border-state legislation.
(3) The availability of abortion providers within a state increases
abortion rates, even after controlling for the simultaneity between abortion
supply and demand. Nonhospital providers are particularly important in
abortion availability, and appear to be the marginal provider. The availability
of providers appears to predominantly affect cross-state migration for abortion,
not the actual propensity to have an abortion.
(4)Patternsof party control in a state and voting patterns among
representatives from a state do not appear related to abortions in any easily
explained pattern.
(5)Economicand demographic variables, strongly correlated with
cross-sectional abortion rates, have smaller effects in panel data with state
fixed effects. Increases in unemployment and state per capita income show a3
strong positive correlation with abortion, while increases in maniage rates and
in the black population share show a negative correlation with abortion rates.
(6) In contrast to the strong effects of medicaid funding restrictions,
parental consent requirements for teen abortions appear to have few effects on
aggregate abortion rates. There are few differences in the determinants of teen
versus nonteen abortion rates or white versus nonwhite abortion rates, although
this conclusion is limited by the fact that we have information on these
subgroup abortion rates only for a nonrandom sample of states and years.
II
Existing Research on Abortion Determinants
Astandard approach to analyzing abortion rates involves cross-sectional
regression of state abortion rates against .a variety of demographic, social and
policy-related variables.2 Such regressions indicate that state characteristics,
such as metropolitan population share, marriage rates, religious affiliation,
median income levels, and avenge education levels, are significantly
correlated with abortion rates across states. Variables measuring abortion
availability, either by price or number of abortion providers, are also
significant. In addition, this research often includes controls for abortion-
related policies, usually the availability of public funds for abortions among
medicaid-eligible women, and finds these policies highly significant.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to control for the full range of state-specific
differences in these sort of cross-sectional regressions. As a result, many of
the estimated coefficients could be biased, reflecting correlations between the
included independent variables and a variety of omitted variables. One might
believe that this is particularly true of the policy variables; states that provide
2Examples of thisincludeSina,1986; Medoff,1988;andGagbacz, 1990; Bordcis and
Cutrlght, 1979, usc crou-.cctional SMSAdata.4
funding for medicaid abortions may vary in a number of ways not measured
through the independent 'variables, biasing the policy coefficients upward. In
addition, several of these analyses also fail to recognize that there are serious
endogeneity problems with including a measure of abortion providers (supply
of abortions) when estimating abortion demand.Since the two are
simultaneously determined, regressions that do not take this simultaneity into
account will produce a biased estimate of the abortion provider coefficient.3
This paper improves on past analyses in three ways. First, we use a
panel data set of state abortion rates over time. Including state fixed effects
to control for unmeasured heterogeneity between the states that is not captured
in the independent variables, we can estimate the effect of changes in
demographic, economic, and policy variables over time within states on
abortion rates.This is a much better approach to understanding the
determinants of abortion than relying upon cross-sectional state variation.4
Second, we instrument the abortion provider variable. Third, we have put a
great deal of time and effort into coding a wide variety of independent
variables across states and years, in order to estimate more complete policy
and political climate effects.
In contrast to those studies investigating aggregate state abortion rates,
a limited number of studies have used individual micro-data to analyze
3Exceptionsto thisare Medoff(1988), who estimates theeffectofprices on abortion
with a two-stage least squares procedure, and Hans-Wilson (1993a) who instruments the
number of abortion providers.
recent working paper by Hans-Wilson (199Th)usesstate panel data to estlinate 5
yearsofabortion rates in the 1980g. Shecannotuse state fixed effects, however, because
several of her independent variables do not vary over time within the state; this Loses much
of th. advantag, of panel data.S
abortion decisions.5 These studies providea betteranalysis of individual
decision-making than any estimate based on aggregate state abortion rates, and
they indicate some of the key variables (such as labor force participation,
marital status, income levels, and metropolitan location) that one would like
tocontrol for in estimatingstate aggregate abortion rates. But we lackmicro-
datathattracktheabortiondecisions ofsequentialsamples of womenover
time.
A number of studies have focused particularly on the enactment of public
policies related to abortion. Perhaps the major public policy debate has
revolved around whether public funding for abortions should be available
through medicaid, the public health insurance program available to low income
women.6 In 1976 Congress cut off federal funding of abortion for medicaid
clients through legislation known as the Hyde Amendment. This restriction
was initially blocked by a court restraining order, but went into effect in
August 1977 and has remained in effect ever siüce, except for a 7 month
period in 1980 when it was temporarily blocked by another restraining
order.7 As discussed below in more detail, a number of states have chosen
to continue to fund medicaid abortions using state funds.
A variety of studies investigated the immediate effects of the cut-off of
federal funding for medicaid abortions in the late l970s by studying abortion
behavior in selected locations before and after the Hyde amendment went into
5Micro-data estimatesof abortion duerminantsamong.dolcsccntsarcdonebyLundberg
and Plotnick(1990), Joyce(1988), and Cooksey (1990). Tones and Forrest (1988) survey
women'sreasons for choosing abortion.
6Access to medicaid has historically been primarily available to participants in the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program.
7Thcexceptions to the Hyde Amendment have also tightened.SinceJune 1981 • the only
case inwhichthe federal government will pay foranabortion through medicaid is when the
pregnancy endangersthewoman's life.6
effect.8In general, these studies indicate that 20 to 25 percent of the women
who would have received publicly funded abortions instead gave birth when
that funding became unavailable. In the cross-sectional analyses of abortion
rates cited above (typically based on a selected year in the 1980s) state public
funding for medicaid abortions always has a significant positive effect on
abortion rates. Similarly, simple comparisons of states with and without
public funding indicate abortion rates are higher in these states (Haas-Wilson,
1993a). But, as noted above, in these latter studies this effect may reflect
other unmeasured state-specific differences between states that do and do not
fund medicaid abortions.
The other most contentious state policy debate has been over state
parental notification and consent. laws for minors seeking abortions. The legal
history of these laws' evolution is complex; a substantial number of states have
laws on the books that are or were enjoined at particular times by the courts.
In addition, the Supreme Court itself has issued a series of evolving decisions,
including a requirement that any such law have some form of judicial bypass
available for minors. A number of studies have looked at the implementation
of parental consent and notification laws in particular states,9 and indicated
that immediately after the implementation of these laws, the number of teen
abortions within the state falls. Cartoof and Kierman (1986), investigating
changes in the Massachusetts law, find that few teens affected by the law did
not get abortions, but a substantial fraction traveled out of state for them.
Haas-Wilson (l993a) indicates that states without parental notification have
higher teen abortion rates on average.
tkubin,etal., 1979; Gold, 1980; Trusscll, et.al. 1980; Catca, 1981; Henshawand
Walhiach,1984.
9Cartoofand Klennan,1986; Rogers, Ct.al..1991.7
In short, the existing literature on the determinants of abortion indicates
that a substantial number of economic and demographic variables appear to be
correlated with state abortions rates ata point in time. Similarly, restrictions
on medicaid funding and the presence of parental notification appear to
decrease abortion rates within a state. Most of these studies are focused on
cross-sectional estimates from a single year, or study the implementation of
various policies in a specific location at a particular point in time. This paper
is the first research to use all available data on abortion rates across states and
years to measure how abortion rates change as changes occur in policy,
political climate, economic and demographic variables, and provider
availability.
Ill
DataonAbortion and its Related Determinants
Thissection summarizes the data we use in this paper, with particular
attention to the abortion data and policy variables. We describe this data in
some detail, in part because the value of this paper depends heavily upon the
careful collection of stale-year data relating to abortion. Appendix 1 provides
detailed information on sources and coding for all the variables used in the
paper, while appendix tables I and 2 provide summarystatistics.
A.Abortion Data
There are two primary sources of abortion data available in this country.
The Center for Disease Control (CDC) publishes annual numbers on reported
legal abortions from state central health agencies.1° These data areavailable
from 1974 through 1990, but not all states report these data in every year.
1% some cases,they supplement thisdata fromadditionaisources.8
These data are also incomplete in many states, without information from all
providers.In addition to total abortions, CDC also publishes abortion
numbers by race and by age for those states that collect this information.
These are the only available data on abortion among subgroups of the
population, albeit from a nonrandom sample of states.
The second source of abortion data is the Alan Guttmacher Institute
(Aol), which conducts a periodic survey of all identified abortion providers
in the United States. This provides data on the number of abortions performed
in all states from 1973-92, with the exception of 1983, 1986, 1989, 1990,
when surveys were not conducted.11 The AG! data are more complete, both
because they cover all states in all available years but also because AOl works
hard to compile a complete list of all abortion providers, thereby collecting
information from many smaller clinics that are missing from the CDC data.
Figure 1 shows the trend in abortion usage over time. The solid line
shows the total number of abortions reported by AG! data for all states from
1973-92. The dotted line plots the AG! data for the subset of 35 states for
which CDC data is available from 1974-90 and the dashed line plots the CDC
data for these states. While the AOl data consistently report more abortions
than the CDC data, the trends are very similar. The correlation between the
two series in the restricted sample of states and years for which both are
available is 0.988. Figure 2 plots the average annual number of abortions in
all states for AG! data and in the 35 states which have CDC data from 1974-
88 and indicates that the similarity between these two data sources is visible
11flenshaw and Van Von (1992) provide detailed informationon the AGI survey and
its methodology. The 1991 and 1992 AG! abortion data have Jun been released;
unfortunately, many of our dependent variabies arc not yet available for these years. Thus.
although we show the 1991 and 1992 data in the graphs in this section, in the estimation
section we use only the 13 yearsofdata from 1974 to 1988,excluding the missingyears of
1983 and 1986.9
not just in aggregate, but state-by-state as well)2 Given these similarities
and the more complete reporting for the AG! data, we will use AG! data in
ow analysis of aggregate abortion rates.
The abortion variable most often cited is the abortion rate, the number
of abortions per 1000 women between the ages of 15-44 (which we refer to
as the female fertile population) for each state and year)3 This number
indicates the abortion rate among the population at risk of conception.
Changes in this rate will reflect both changes in conception rates, as well as
changes in abortion rates, conditional upon conception.t4 The solid line in
figure 3 plots the abortion rate overtime, showing a slow decLine since 1981.
The abortion data collected by both AG! and CDC provide information
on the number of abortions that occur within a state, which creates a potential
inconsistency problem in the abortion rate: The numerator, number of
abortions, is reported in the state where they occur, but the denominator,
female fertile population, is based on state of residence. To the extent that
women travel across state lines for abortions, some jurisdictions may report
very high abortion rates. This is most noticeable in the District of Columbia.
which has an abortion rate 4 times higher than any other jurisdiction (165
abortions per 1000 fertile women), reflecting the number of women from the
12Thestate numbersinfigure 2 correspond to an alphabetical orderingofthe states. A
keyis providedin AppendixTable2, which shows average state abortion data from 1974-88
using AGI and (where available) CDC data.
t3Calling this age groupofwomen the female fertile population is not entirely
accurate, sincenot all of thesewomen are fertile, but thisis the best available approximation
to the fertile population.
140ne can calculate the abortion ratio, abortions per pregnancy, but the data on
pregnanciesare less accurate. This paperinvestigates the total effect of our variableson
abortion rates. It is difficult to separate this into the indirecteffect(through changes in
coaception) and the direct effect (on abortions post-conception); we leave this to future
raseareb.10
surrounding region who go to D.C. for abortions. This is not necessarily a
problem.If we want to measure the effects of differences in state
characteristics and policy on in-state abortion rates, the effect of changes in
these variables on the number of women who enter or leave the state for
abortions is as important as their effect on the resident population.
If, however, we are interested in the effects of state characteristics and
policy on the actual number of state residents who have an abortion (whether
in-state or out-of-state), then we need alternative abortion data. AG! estimates
the number of abortions among state residents, based on their abortion data by
state of occurrence.t5 The dashed line in figure 3 shows abortion rates by
state of residence.16Figure 4 shows 1988 abortion rates by state of
occurrence versus abortion rates by state of residence. As should be clear,
there is substantial cross-state migration in some cases. While the resident
abortion data has two problems (it is available over a shorter period and it is
estimated less accurately than the occurrence abortion data), we will
investigate the differences in the determinants of these two series below.
While AG! collects only aggregate abortion numbers, CDC also reports
state-specific information on abortions by age and race in states whose public
health agencies collect such data. The absence of national information on
abortions by age and by race means that the generalizability of any results for
these subgroups may be less than when we look at aggregate abortion rates.
AG!usesa relatively complex algorithm for this calculation, described in Henshaw
andVan Vort (1992). The data arc available in a consistent form from 1978-88(omitting
1983 and3986).Earlierestimates usinga different calculation procedure for 1974-77 are
available,butthey appearto bequite different from the laterdata, and we donot usc them.
The difference bctween abortionrates byresidenceand occurrence reflects both
potential inaccuracies in theestimatesof residence abortions, as wellasabortions perfonned
outside the country.11
Information on differences in abortion rates between teens and nonteens
is available from the CDC for 24 states from 197490.h7 This is less
complete data for a nonrandom sample of states than the AOL aggregate
abortion numbers provide, but it is the only available information on age-
specific abortion rates. Figure 5 plots teen abortion rates per 1000 fertile
teens and nonteen abortion rates per 1000 fertile nonteens.'8For
comparison, figure 5alsoplots the avenge abortion rate for the entire
population in all states. While the majority of abortions are to nonteens, the
teen abortion rate is approximately 1.4 times higher than the nonteen abortion
rate. The teen abortion rate also peaks later and falls less over the 1980s; the
overall cot-relation between the teen and nonteen abortion rate series is 0.934.
The AOL data on aggregate abortion rates in all states tracks the nonteen
abortion rate relatively closely (its higher level reflects the greater number of
abortions in the AOL versus the CDC data.)
Figure 6 plots abortion levels and abortion rates for the white and
nonwhite population, based on the 18 states that report this information from
l97490.19 Although the vast majority of abortions are to white women,
nonwhite women have dramatically higher abortion rates over this time period.
t7Most other states either do not report this data at all, or report it only for a very small
number of years. These 24 states account for 42.2 percent of all abortions onaverage over
theseyears.
18The denominator for the teen abortion rate is the number of women between the ages
of 15and 20 inthe state. Thedenominator forthenonteenabortion rate is thenumberof
womcnbetweentheagesof2land44 inthcstazc.
19Aggregate abortions in these 18 states represent 30.3 percent of all abortions over
these years.The definition ofnonwhite' varies depending on howstatehealth agencies
collect thisinfonnatioo. Foreach year and state, we calculate the white fertile population
as thepercentwhite in the state, multiplied by the female fertile population. We calculate
the nonwhitefertile population asthe percent black in the state, multiplied bythefemale
fertilepopulation.To the extentthat CDCdataincludespersons who arcnotblack in the
nonwhite count, this willoverstate thenonwhite abortion rate.12
The trends in the two data series are also quite different, as evinced by their
correlation of -0.134.
B.Abortion Provider Data
The AC reports on the total number of abortion providers by state from
1973-88, in all years except 1983 and 1986, and also separates this total into
the number of hospital and nonhospital abortion providers. Figure 7 plots the
total number of abortion providers between 1974 and 1988 per 1000 fertile
women, as well as the number of hospital and nonhospital providers per 1000
fertile women. The relative number of providers rises until around 1978, is
essentially flat through1982, andthen falls steadily through the rest of the
1980s. The relative number of hospital providers falls throughout much of this
period, while the number of nonhospital providers rises. Dividing the
total number of abortions by the total number of providers, this ratio rises
from 497 in 1975 to 742 by 1988.
If the number of abortions in each state and year reflect a supply/demand
equilibrium, it is not clear why we would be interested in controlling for the
number of abortion providers. There are two reasons to include this variable
as one of the determinants of abortion, however. First, some claim that the
protests against abortion providers have constrained their numbers, in which
case we would want to take this constraint into account. Second, we lack
price information on abortions by state and year. One can view the number
of providers in a state as a proxy for prices. Travel distance may also be a
proxy for price and constraint. We pick up distance effects, however, in the
state fixed effect since state size is unchanged over time; in part, we also
control for distance by controlling for the share of the nonmetropolitan
20This change is not unique to abortions. Avarietyof minor surgicalprocedures moved
front hospital to out-patient clink. over this time period.13
population in a state in each year. Henshaw (1991) discusses the fish range
of possible constraints on access to abortion.
C. Policy Variables
Publicfunding laws. Asdiscussed above, a number of states have used
state funds to pay for medicaid abortions for low-income women since the
passage of the Hyde Amendment prohibited federal funding. We code a
variable between 0 and 1, equal to the share of the year in which a medicaid-
eligible woman in that state has no access to public funding for an abortion
(either federal or state).21
The solid line in figure 8 plots this variable over time, weighted by the
share of the female fertile population in each state; the result is the share of
the population in states without public funding of medicaid abortions in each
year. The share starts at under. 10 percent in 1974, jumps in 1977 with the
implementation of federal restrictions, drops briefly during the 1980 embargo
on the federal law, and then gradually increases through the l980s. In 1990,
over 60 percent of women live in states where publicly funded abortions are
not available.
In addition to the indicator variable for state funding of abortions, plotted
in figure 8, we also experiment with two measures of the quantity of women
eligible for publicly funded abortions. First, we have some data on the
number of publicly funded abortions in a state. Combining information from
several sources (see Appendix 1), we created data on the number of publicly
funded abortions by state for the years 1978-83, 1985, and 1987. We have
21We spent a great deal of time collecting accurate information on this variable. A
lengthy appendix describing our data sources and codingnate-by-state isavailable from the
authors on request.Some cmtn allowonlyvet'limitedstatefunding for medicaid
abortions, such as in situations ofrapeorincest. We group these stateswith those that
provideno state funding.14
hesitations about this data, however. It is available for only alimited number
of years and, given it comes from a variety of sources for each stateand year,
we suspect thatthisseries is not highly accurate.
Second, we also use information on AFDC caseloads for single parents.
Over our time period, all AFDC recipients are "categorically eligible" for
medicaid. A few states have a few alternative eligibility options for low-
income women, but these compose a very small share of the medicaid
caseload. Thus, the AFDC caseload is the best estimate of the number of
women eligible for publicly funded abortions, in the statesthat make such
funding available. Because AFDC eligibility rules differ substantially across
states, the share of the female population on AFDC varies across states; as
AFDC caseloads rise, one might expect abortions to rise in states that provide
public funding to this Population.
Parental consent laws. As diséussed above, over the 1980s a growing
number of states enacted various parental consent or notification laws for
teenagers seeking abortions. While we have experimented with coding a more
disaggregated variable that distinguishes between no law, and requirements for
parental notification, parental consent, or adult counselling, we end up using
a variable that simply equals 1 if either notification or consent restrictions on
teens are in place in any state and year. The dashed line in figure 8 plots the
share of the teenage population (ages 15-20) that are in states covered by such
legislation in each year. This share grows from less than 5 percent to over 20
percent from 1979 to 1990. Compared to medicaid funding restrictions,
however, these laws are much less common and impact only younger women.
Given this, we would expect teen restrictions to have weaker affects on
aggregate abortion rates.
Border state policies. If there is migration across state boundaries for
abortion, abortions in a state should be affected not only by the state's own15
laws, but also by the laws of surrounding states. Thus, we also create two
border state policy variables,measuringthe policies of surrounding states with
regard to medicaid funding and teen restrictions. These variables are based
on policies in all physically contiguous states. The closer these states, the
more likely that their policies will induce migration of women across state
lines for abortion. Thus, we create a variable which is the weighted avenge
of the policy variable in all border states, using the (inverse) distance between
the capital of the given state and the capital of each border state as
weights.22 If all surrounding states have restricted policies, this variable
equals I; if none have restrictive policies, the variable equals 0.
1IFDC benefit lewlc. Finally, we also control for the maximum AFDC
benefits available to a single woman with 3 children in each state and year.
Some have claimed that higher AFDC benefits create an incentive for
unmarried women to have children, by providing them financial support as
single parents.
D.Political ClimateVariables
Enjoined laws. In addition to policy variables based on actively enforced
laws, there are a number of states that passed restrictions on medicaid funding,
but had these laws enjoined by the courts for a period of time due to their
explicit formulation. Such enjoined laws may be viewed as indicating that the
climate of a state is more hostile than in states with no enjoined restrictions.
This may affect the behavior of abortion providers, the likelihood that women
leave or enter the state for abortion, and the ease with which low income
women are able to receive medicaid funding for abortions. To measurethe
As it turns out, wcizting by didance has little effect. The results reported below arc
vinually identical if an unwcightcd avenge of border state policies is used instead. We also
experimented with population weights.16
impactof this on abortion, we code a 0/1variable thatidentifies years in
which specific states have passed laws restricting public finding of medicaid
abortions and where these laws have been ruled unconstitutional by the state
courts. We identify this as a political climate variable, because we believe that
it is a proxy for state opposition to abortion, but we realize that this could also
be considered a direct policy variable.
Parry affiliation.Wehave coded information on party affiliation in each
state. For each year, we have coded whether the state governor is Republican,
whether the state House is controlled by Republicans, and whether the state
Senate is controlled by Republicans. The effects of these variables, entered
separately or used in various combinations or lags, are discussed below.
COPErankings. Partyaffiliation is often considered a weak positional
indicator on the abortion issue. Its meaning also varies across regions, so that
southern Democrats in some states may be more conservative on social issues
than northern Republicans in other states. As an alternative coding for the
state social policy climate, we coded the rankings from the AFL-CIO
Committee on Political Education (COPE), based on the roll call voting
behavior of a state's federal Senators on domestic policy issuesP
E.Other Demographic and Economic Variables
In addition to those variables directly related to abortion, we have
collected state-by-year data on a wide variety of other state indicators. These
include demographic information on marriage rates, birth rates, the share of
teenagers among all fertile women, the share of older women (ages 35-44)
Thc evidence indicates that measuresof political ideology bascd onroll call votes are
reliable. Avarictyofthcserankingsareavailable, but are all highlycorrelated with each
other. We use theCOPErankings bccauscthey focuson domesticpolicy issues, whichwe
cxpectto bemorecorrelated withabortionideology.See Holbrook-Provowand Poe(1987).17
among all fertile women, the black share of the population, and the share of
the population living in nonmetropolitan regions. We also include economic
information on unemployment rates, per capita income, and labor force
participation among women. In general, we tried to select aggregate state
variables that were consistent with micro-level evidence on the determinants
of pregnancy and abortion, as discussed above.
lv
Estimation Methodology
Weare primarily interested in the determinants of abortion rates. For
anystate sandyear t, we specify this in the following way:
(1)AbortionRateg =a1P+ a2Cg + a3Y + a4X + + (01+st
whereP is a vector of policy variables, C is a vector of political climate
variables, Y is the number of abortion providers in each year and state, Xis
&vectorof state and year specific economic and demographic variables, g5is
a vector of state-specific fixed effects, w is a vector of year-specific fixed
effects, and e is a random error term that varies by state and year. The state
fixed effects capture any permanent differences in abortion rates across states,
such as differences due to religious or ethnic composition. The year fixed
effects capture any components in abortion rates that are common across all
states in year t, such as the effect of national economic trends. Note that in
standard cross-sectional estimates of abortion rates, the inability to control for
the unmeasured differences that are captured in these fixed effects means that
the coefficients on other variables can become contaminated by omitted
variables that are state and year specific.
One fundamental problem with equation (1) is that the variable Y is
endogenous, since the availability of abortion providers is at least partially18
determined by the demand for abortion. Without attention to this problem,the
estimated coefficient on provider availability is biased. The classicalsolution
to this problem is to find instruments for Y,variables that are correlated with
the numberof abortionproviders but which are independent from the demand
for abortion. We utilize two instruments, the total number of physiciansand
the total number of hospitals in each state and year (see appendix 1for
sources). While both of these variables may be related to the overalldemand
for medical services in a state, there is little reason to believe that they are
significantly impacted by the demand forabortion.24 Yet, areas with more
physicians per person or hospitals per person, are also likely tohave more
abortion providers. Using these instruments, we can estimate the effect of
providers using a standard two stage least squares (TSLS) procedure, whereby
the availability of abortion providers is estimated in a first stage equation:
(2) Y= fl1Phy31 ÷ P2Hosp1+$3Pd + + + 03 + +
wherePhy and i-iosp are the number of physicians and the number of hospitals
in each state and year, P, C, and X are the vectors of policy, political climate,
demographic and economic variables included in equation (1), and 0andX are
state and year effects for abortion providers. The estimated result from this




We start by estimating the log of abortion rates between 1974 and 1988
for all states, for the 13 years in which AG! data is available. We drop 1973
24la fact, TatalovichandDaynes (1989) indicaxethat only35 percentof hospitalsoffered
abortionservices in1986.19
becauseit isclearly a transitionyear; abortion isnot generally available
throughoutthis country until 1974. The resulting sample contains 650
observations,with 50 states and 13 years of data in each state.
A. Abortion RatesbyState of Occurrence
Table 1 prósents our standard specification.27 Column 1 presents the
estimates for the determinants of abortion rates, by state of occurrence, with
a complete set of state and year fixed effects. Column 2 presents the same
estimates without any fixed effects; in this case, the data is essentially treated
as a large cross section. The inclusion of fixed effects—particularly state
effects—significantly changes the estimated coefficients. Many variables that
are correlated across states and significant in column 2 have little effect in
column 1. For instance, while log per capital income is highly significant in
column 2, much of this effect is due to the fact that states with higher incomes
throughout this time period are also states which have consistently higher
abortion rates throughout the time period. Over time within a state, the effect
of changes in per capita income on the abortion rate is much smaller. This is
consistent with the belief that there are omitted variables that vary across states
noted above,although we have 1991and 1992data on abortion rascs,•we lack data
onthese years fora number of our independent variables.
26Ncbraskais excludedfrom the regression analysis,bringing us from 51 to 50 daZes.
Thisis because Nebraska has a unicameral and nonpartisan state legislature, which cannot
be codedfor partyaffiliation.
27In addition to those specifications presented below, we inveigaicd a number of other
alternatives, includingusinglaggedpolicy variables; letting the first year ofa policychange
havea different effectthansubsequent years;interacting the policy changes with
demographic variables; and usingthelog of the number of abortions as the dependent
variable, with the logofthe population on the right hand aide of the equation. None of
thesealternativesproduced substantiallydifferent results.20
and thatare correlated with the included variables andabortion rates, which
biastheresultsfrom cross-sectional regressions.28
The first coefficient in column 1indicatesthata statethat moves from
fundingtonot funding medicaidabortions willexperiencealarge and
significant decrease inthe abortionrate.Column1of table 2 translatesthe
coefficientson a few of the key policy variables into their estimated impact on
abortion rates. Table 2 indicates that astateat the mean of all other variables
will experience a 13.4 percent drop in its abortion rate when it restricts
funding for abortion, a decline of 3.5 abortions per 1000 women.This is
surprisingly large, and suggests that this variable may be measuring morethan
the direct effect of the state law on abortions among low-income women. If
state restrictions on medicaid-funded abortions are enacted at the same time as
thegeneralclimate toward abortion is becoming more conservative, then this
variablewould pickup both thedirect effectsofthe restrictions onlow-income
women and the relatedeffectsof attitudinal change in the state, which could
lead toeither adecrease in the numberof higher-incomewomen whoobtain
abortionsor an increase in the number of women who leave the state for
abortions. We return to this below.
The impact of teenage restrictions in table 1 is essentially zero, with a
perverse sign.Table2 indicates that imposing teen restrictions appears to lead
toa 4.7 percentincrease in in-state abortion rates. Given thesmall share of
teenage abortions among allabortions, it is perhaps not surprising that
28Amongthe possible omitted variablesarcreligious affiliation (not available by state
for each year, but varies little within .nsn over time) and laws regarding contraceptive
availability (mostly passedinthe 1930s sad 60s, so do not vary much over time). These and
other variables which differ acrou ,'.'n but not over time are subsumed in state faxed
effects. One variablewhich willvary over Limewithin dates ispro-life political activity.
We have no measure of this by state and year. The highly organized and targeted protests
did not start until after 19*8, the end of our data.21
aggregate abortion rates are not significantly affected by this variable. Border
state restrictions on teen abortions also have no effect.
Bordering state restrictions on medicaid fimding for abortion have a
significant effect on in-state abortion rates in table 1. If 1 of 4 equidistant
bordering states initiates abortion restrictions, the in-state abortion rate
increases by 5.2percent(see table2.) Thiscross-state effect on the location
of abortion is consistent with the Tiebout hypothesis about people's response
to competing opportunities in different potiticaljurisdictions. The correlation
between changes in border state medicaid funding policy and changes in the
number of women receiving a within-state abortion is also further evidence for
the proposition that there are other changes in behavior and attitudes occurring
at the same time that restrictions on abortion funding for low-income women
are implemented in a state.Medicaid-eligible residents in a state with
restrictions cannot qualify for medicaid-paid abortions in another state. Given
this, there is little reason for low-income women to go to another state and
expend travel costs. Thus, the in-state increases in abortion due to changes in
nearby state laws must almost entirely reflect behavioral changes that affect
women other than low-income women and that occur at the same time as the
medicaid funding changes.
Changes in AFDC benefits have no affect on abortion rates over time in
these states. At least in part, this is because AFDC benefits change little over
time in these states, therefore the inclusion of state fixed effects absorbs most
of the variation in public assistance in the data.
Changes in the political climate variables have interesting effects. A
state that passes restrictions on medicaid funding, but has that law enjoined by
the courts, experiences a 6.7 percent drop in abortion rates (see table 2.) An
enjoined law should have no direct effects on abortion, since no restrictions
have been imposed on the funding of abortions for low-income women. The
significance of this variable again suggests that the passage of funding22
restriction laws are correlated with other changes in abortion availability and
women's willingness to seek abortions.
Party affiliation within the state has no significant effect on abortion
rates. Extensive Republican or Democratic control in a state is uncorrelated
with abortion rates. We explore alternative specifications for party affiliation
below.
The availability of abortion providers is highly significant in column I
of table 1, even after instrumenting this variable to eliminate any potential
endogeneity through the two stage least squares procedures described
above.29 The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that a 10 percent
increase in the number of abortion providers at the mean leads to a 5.7percent
increase in the abortion rate (table 2). Column 3 of table 1 presents the results
from simple OLS procedure that does not account for endogeneity between the
demand for and supply of abortions. The coefficient from the TSLS
estimation is similar to the coefficient from the OLS procedure, but estimated
with less precision. A Hausman test indicates that the TSLS and OLS
coefficients are not significantly different. While we continue to use the TSLS
procedure in all further estimates presented below, these results indicate that
the effect of provider availability on the rate of abortion that occurs within a
state is not the result of endogeneity bias.
Once state and year fixed effects are included, changes in economic or
demographic variables over time within a state appear to have relatively small
effects on state abortion rates. The strongest remaining effect is the positive
relationship between unemployment and abortion rates. As the economy
moves into recession, a 1-point rise in the unemployment rate leads to about
a 3 percent increase in abortion rates. Estimated with slightly less precision
but still significant at the 5percentlevel, decreases in marriage rates and
Appendix table 3reports thefirst stage regression results.23
increases in per capita income lead to an increase in the abortion rate. More
surprisingly, increases in the percent of the black population in a state are
correlated with reductions in abortion rates, controlling for all other variables
in the regression and for fixed differences across states. .Giventhe high
nonwhite abortion rates noted above, this is surprising. Since changes in the
percent of the black population in the state are almost entirely due to changes
black state residency over this time period, this potentially suggests that black
in-migrants are self-selected to be less likely to utilize abortion.
The general conclusions from the regressions in columns 1 to 3 of table
1 on the determinants of abortion rates by state of occurrence are that
restrictions on medicaid funding for abortion have strong effects over time on
the abortion rate within states and on the movement of women across states,
while restrictions on teenagers have little effect on aggregate rates. Political
climate appears to be important, particularly as proxied by the presence of
enjoined laws. Party affiliation in the state matters less. The availability of
abortion providers has strong effects on abortion rates, even after adjusting for
endogeneity. State demographic characteristics are less important once state
fixed effects are included, although changes in the unemployment rate, the
marriage rate, per capita income and the black population share do affect
abortion rates over time within a state.
The year effects estimated in column 1 provide a measure of the
unexplained variation across years that remains in the data after controlling for
all the variables in the model. Figure 9 plots the 13 year effects estimated
from the regression in column 1. (By definition, all of these are measured
relative to the omitted (1988) effect, which is zero.) This plot indicates that
there is some unexplained increase in abortion rates over the 1970s, an effect
we suspect is related to increasing acceptance of abortion as a viable medical
option by many women. An unexplained decline in abortion rates occurs
between 1980 and 1982, for which we have no good explanation. After 1982,24
there is no remaining unexplained trend in the data, indicating that our model
fully captures movements in abortion rates during the 1980s.
B.Abortion Rates by Stateof Residence
The results in columns 1-3 of table 1 suggest a substantial amount of
cross-state migration is induced by policy changes in nearby states. They also
indicate surprisingly large effects of policy (even unenforced policy) on the
number of abortions performed within a state.
An alternative question is to investigate the impact of these variables on
the abortion rate of women who live within the state, regardless of where the
abortion actually occurred. Such estimates provide a measure of the effect of
policy on women's likelihood of having an abortion, while the previous
estimates looked at the effect of policy on in-state abortion rates. Columns 4
and 5oftable 1 provide TSLS and OLS estimates of the determinants of
abortion by state of residence, using the same specification as before. As
discussed above, these estimates are limited to the 9 years between 1978-88
when AG! published consistent estimates of abortions by state of residence.
The most striking result in column 4 is that the impact of medicaid
policy on abortions by state of residence is less than half of its effect on
abortion by state of occurrence. Table 2 indicates that the imposition of
medicaid restrictions reduces abortions among residents by 4.8 percent,
compared to a 13.4 percent reduction of in-state abortions. This suggests that
a large share of the measured policy effect in column I occurs because women
go across state boundaries for an abortion, which changes thelocation of their
abortion, but does not change the fict that they have an abortion. Consistent
with this result, border state medicaid policies have almost no effect on
abortion rates by state of residence.
As with abortion rates by state of occurrence, teen restrictions and
AFDC benefit levels have little effect on aggregate abortion rates by state of25
residence. The effect of enjoined restrictions on abortion rates among
residents is insignificant and has a positive coefficient. The political affiliation
variables are somewhat puzzling, showing a significant negative effect on
abortions when a state is under strong Democratic control, and no effect to
Republican control. The demographic variables have generally similar effects
in column 4 as in column 1, although their standard errors are larger as the
sample size shrinks.
The impact of provider availability on abortions by state of residence is
poorly determined, with an unexpected negative sign. Column S shows the
equivalent OLS regression, in which the provider variable is not instrumented.
While instrumentation had little effect on the measured impact of providers on
abortion rates by state of occurrence, it has a strong effect on the impact of
providers on abortion rates by state of residence.Specifically, once the
variable is purged of any simultaneity with the dependent variable, it has no
correlation with abortion rates by state of residence. This suggests that
provider availability induces women to change the location of their abortions
(as the number of providers shrinks, more women go out-of-state for an
abortion), but it has little affect on whether women have an abortion or not.
Further evidence on the extent of movement across states is given in
column 6 of table 1. This column uses the difference in the log abortion rate
by state of occurrence and the log abortion rate by state of residence as the
dependent variable. This a measure of net abortion migration in or out of a
state.3° These results indicate that three policy variables drive net abortion
migration: more women tend to go out-state for an abortion when the state
Ideally, one wouldliketo talce the log of the difference between the abortion rates by
data of occurrence and date of residence as the depcndcntvarisble, but this involves taking
S log of a negativenumber insomeinstances.We havetrieda variety of other forms for
thedependent variable In column 6 (such as the unlogged difference in abortion rates, or the
log of the raw numerical differences). While the numbers differ somewhat, the general
conclusions are identical with these other specifications.26
implements restrictions on medicaid funding (whether enforced or not), while
more women come in-state for an abortion when neighboring states put on
funding restrictions.
Overall, what do these results indicate about the impact of abortion
policy on abortion rates? Teen restrictions appear to have no significant
affects on aggregate abortion rates, no matter how measured. (They may have
a significant affect on teen abortion rates, but it is not so large an effect as to
impact total abortion rates.) In contrast, medicaid funding policy is highly
related to abortion rates. Our results indicate that medicaid restrictions seem
to be correlated with other changes in the perceived or actual availability of
abortion within a state, and induce a substantial number of women to go out-
state for an abortion. Since there is no advantage to low-income women for
following this strategy (in fact, it only increases the cost of abortion to them),
this suggests that other things are changing in the state at the same time as
these laws change and driving women of all income levels to change their
abortion-seeking behavior. Call this the "indirect effect" of medicaid funding
laws, as opposed to their direct effect on low income women.
The best evidence of this indirect effect is the significant drop in in-state
abortions that occur at the time that laws are enacted, even when the actual
implementation of these laws is enjoined by the courts. We can only speculate
about what might be causing this indirect effect. The publicity given to the
legislative fight over medicaid funding restrictions might be a signal to all
women that there is more hostility to abortion in the state; the enactment of
these laws might indicate that anti-abortion groups have been actively
conducting information and publicity campaigns in the state, changing some
women's behavior; these legislative fights might also make abortion providers
more cautious about the number of abortions they perform, and lead them to
discourage potential clients.27
It is difficult from this data to estimate the direct impact of medicaid
funding restrictions on low-income women only, since we have no information
on abortion rates among women by income category. We do, however, have
several potential estimates of this effect. The differences in the coefficients
on medicaid policy between columns 1 and 2 of table 2 indicate that about 8.6
percent (13.4-4.8) of women in a state have out-state abortions when medicaid
funding restrictions are enacted (a potential measure of the "indirect effect"),
while only 4.8 percent forego an abortion. If this latter coefficient is entirely
a measure of the direct effect (i.e., all of the women actually discouraged from
having an abortion are medicaid-eligible women) and if we utilize the fact that
22 percent of all abortions are publicly funded (in the states that fund
abortions), this means that about22percent of all previously publicly-funded
abortions are being prevented.31 This is surely a maximal estimate. If the
"indirect effect" of changes in the state environment for abortion are strong
enough to induce 8.6 percent of the (probably nonmedicaid eligible) women
seeking abortions to go out of state, it is not unreasonable to expect that it
might lead to an actual reduction in abortion among these women as well.
A similar estimate is arrived at by comparing the effects of enforced and
unenforced restrictions on medicaid from column 1 in table 2. Assume that
the indirect effects of medicaid laws are measured by the impact of enjoined
laws (which should affect few low income women). If we subtract -6.7
percent from -13.4 percent, this suggests that the direct impact on abortion
rates among low-income women due to the enactment of the law is a -6.7
percent decline in abortions, only slightly higher than the 4.8 percent estimate
based on abortion among residents.
31This issurprisinglyclose to the20-25pcrccnt estimates from studies cited ahoy; that
look at the implementation of laws in p&ticutar dRte..28
C.Robustness of the Policy Effects
Table 3 investigates the robustness of our results on medicaid funding
restrictions to changes in specification. The results in thistable (and all
subsequent tables) are for abortion rates by stateof occurrence. Results on
abortion by state of residence show generally similar patterns tothose
discussed here, unless otherwise noted. Column 1 repeats the resultsfrom
column 1 in table 1, showing only the coefficients on medicaid funding
restrictions, on border state medicaid funding restrictions, and on enactedbut
unenforced medicaid restrictions. Column 2 estimates the same regression, but
omits both the border state policy variables and the unenforced restrictions
variable. The results indicate that the significant negative effect of medicaid
restrictions on aggregate abortion rates is relatively robust to these
specification changes, although its magnitude drops by half when theseother
variables are omitted. This suggests that the inclusion of these other variables
is important. For instance, if states are more likely to disallow medicaid
funding for abortions when neighboring states also have this policy, failing to
control for border state policies results in a coefficient estimate on in-state
medicaid restrictions that is less negative than otherwise, as it combines both
the in-state effect of medicaid restrictions on abortion rates (which is negative)
and the positive effect of more restrictive border state policies, with which it
is correlated.
Columns 3 to 6 test the effect of medicaid restrictions using alternative
measures of the willingness of a state to fund medicaid abortions. As noted
in section 3, for a selected sample of states and years we have data on the
number of publicly funded abortions. This data is available for only 6 years
in selected states, providing 306 observations. Column 3 of table 3 shows the
coefficient on medicaid funding restrictions within this more limited sample,
while column 4 shows the estimates when the medicaid funding policy variable
is replaced with the log of the number of publicly funded abortions within a29
state.Surprisingly, the number of publicly funded abortions have no
significant effect on abortion rates.32 Investigation indicates that this is
primarily the result of the more restricted sample and the nature of this data,
which is not very reliable. Over these limited sample years, most states either
fund or do not fund medicaid abortions in all years; in those states that do
fund medicaid abortions, the number funded is largely constant. Thus, the
variation in publicly handed abortions is largely invariant within states over
time, meaning that it is highly collinear with the state fixed effects and has no
additional explanatory power.
An alternative measure is to use the AFDC caseload in a state. As
explainedabove,this is a good proxy for the number of women eligible for
publicly funded abortions. Columns 5and6 present two specifications using
APDC caseloads. Column S includes both the variable indicating when a state
does not fund public abortions as well as the interaction of the inverse of this
variable with the AFDC caseload as a share of the female fertile population.
This latter. variable measures the effect of caseload changes over time in states
that fund public abortions. If increases in caseload stimulate increases in
abortion in these states, then the second variable should show a significant
coefficient, but it does not. Column 6 includes the AFDC caseload as a share
of the female fertile population, with separate coefficients for those years when
states fund abortions and when they do not. The coefficients indicate that
abortion rates are higher in times when public funding of abortion occurs, and
there is a small not-quite-significant effect of increases in caseloads during
these periods.
The conclusion from these results is that the primary effect of public
funding on abortion occurs because of the implementation or
32Similar results occur if we usc the log of the public abortion rate, or the log of
medicaid dollarsspcnton abortion.30
nonimplementation of restrictions. The availabilityof medicaid within the
state, as proxied by either the number of publiclyfunded abortions in a state,
or the AFDC caseload in the state, has much lesseffect on the abortion rate.
States thatfundmedicaid abortions appear to hind about the same number over
this period,with littlevariation over time.
D.Robustnessof theProviderAvailability Effects
We are also concerned with therobustnessof theestimatedeffectofthe
number ofabortion providers on abortion rates. Table 4 provides several
alternative estimates. The first column repeats the coefficient on abortion
providers from column 1 of table 1, using number of physicians and number
of hospitals as instruments. The second column estimates the impact of
hospital providers only on abortion rates, while the third column estimates the
impact of nonhospital providers (in both of these columns, hospital and
nonhospital providers are instrumented with the same variables used to
instrument total providers.) Column 2 indicates that the availability of
nonhospital providers has the same significant positive effect on abortion rates
as do total providers. In contrast, the estimated coefficient in column 3 for
hospital providers is insignificant. This suggests that it is primarily the
availability of nonhospital providers that affects abortion rates. This is perhaps
not surprising, since these are the more 'marginal" providers who will enter
or leave the market more readily as the climate for abortion changes.33
Finally, the last column of table 4 assumes that the division between
hospital and nonhospital providers is not endogenous to the demand for
33Furthcr cvidcncc that hospital and nonhospitalprovidersdo not play the same role in
the abortion mar¼ ii provided by their relative price structure. In 1989, a lOwcck
abortion corn $245 at the average clinic; in 1991 •theaverage hospital abortion cod $1757.
In part, this reflects the tact that women whousehospitals tend to havemore health
complications relatad to abortion (Henshaw, 1991).31
abortion and enters the share of hospital providers together with the
instrumented total provider variable. The results confirm that an increase in
nonhospital providers is associated with an increase in abortion rates in a state,
even after controlling for total providers.
E. Robustness of Political Climate Effects
We have experimented with a wide variety of specifications regarding
political climate. Table 5presentssome of these results. The first column of
table 5repeatsthe coefficients from column 1 of table 1. As noted above,
these results indicate there is no effect of substantial party control within the
state on abortion rates. Column 2 of table 5entersthe political composition
of each of the three state branches of government separately. The results
indicate that a move to a Republican-controlled house is correlated with an
increase in abortion rates, while a move to a Republican-controlled senate
appears to have significant negative effects on abortion. Republican governors
have no significant effect. We have no ready explanation for these results, but
they are quite robust to specification changes in other variables.
The third and fourth columns enter the same two specifications, but use
the moving average of these variables over the last 4 years, assuming that it
takes time for political changes to impact legislation. It could be that high
abortion rates are one of the factors causing dissatisfaction among some of the
electorate and leading to the election of Republicans; in this case the
contemporaneous correlation between party affiliation andabortion rates is
spurious. The coefficients on lagged party affiliation are similar, however,
although they are estimated with less precision.
As discussed in section 3, we also have a variable that codes political
climate in a state based on the votes of its federal congressional delegation on
domestic policy issues, the COPE rankings, We enter this variable in column32
5and6 (with party affiliation and alone). In neither case do these rankings
show any significant effects on abortion rates.34
Ouroverall conclusionis that party affiliation and federal voting patterns
interact in a complex way with thepoliticalclimate for abortion and the results
are not readily explainable.35 As recent elections in a number of states have
shown,support for abortion does not divide up neatly across party lines. In
addition, the courts have played a key role in a number of states in
determining abortion policy, and we have no easy way of coding court
composition or how courts and legislatures interact.
F.Robustness of Results to the Data Sample
Given our earlier discussion about AG! versus CDC data, it seems useful
in table 6 to show the robustness of our findings to the data that we use.
Column 1 repeats column 1 from table 1, which uses the AG! data on abortion
rates for all years and states in which it is available. Columns 2 and 3 divide
this data into two samples, with column 2 showing results over the first half
of the sample (1974-SO) and column 3 showing results over the second half
(1981-88, excluding 1983 and 1986). Columns 4 and 5 compare AG! and
CDC data. Column 4 uses AG! data on abortion rates, but is based only on
the restricted sample for which CDC data is also available. Column 5
provides comparative estimates using CDC data on abortion rates.
We were pleased (and somewhat surprised) at how similar the results are
across these different data samples. The smaller samples over the 1970s and
34When estimated with abortion rates by state of residence, the COPE ratings appear to
haveasignificant positive effectopabortions, i.e. •inept..witha more liberal federal
representatives, abortion rates are higher.
35Rescarch investigating the dctcnninani.s of state abortion laws discusses the complexity
of appropriate politicalclimatevariablesforabortion policy (Meicrand McFarlane,
1992 and 1993.)33
1980sproduce largerstandard errors and the coefficients on some of the
demographic variablesaresomewhatunstable,butthe pointestimates fromthe
twosamples are very close on most policy, climate, and provider variables.
Estimated on the restricted sample for which CDC data is also available,
the AOl abortion rate estimates in column 4 show results that are generally
similar to those from the full data sample. The most striking difference is that
in the restricted sample the medicaid funding restrictions and the unenforced
medicaid restrictions have a smaller and less significant effect on abortion
rates, while AFDC benefit maximums have a positive and significant effect
and Democratic control of the state has a significant negative effect. Column
5showsthe equivalent estimates using CDC data. While signs and magnitudes
of most coefficients are generally similar, there are differences. Most striking,
within the CDC sample the effects of medicaid funding restrictions and of
unenforced medicaid restrictions on abortion rates have become insignificant
and positive. This may be due to the incompleteness of the CDC data in
reporting abortions among smaller clinics. To the extent that it is the smaller
nonhospital providers which are most responsive to political climate and policy
changes, then data that undercounts the abortion use at these clinics may show
less responsiveness to policy.
Overall, we are reassured by the results in tables 3 to 6,indicatingthat
differences in variable definition and specification tend not to have large
effects on the results.There is substantial evidence that implementing
restrictions on medicaid funding for abortion results in lower aggregate
abortion rates. The fact that border states' restrictions impact where women
have abortions and that even enjoined restrictions impact abortion rates
suggests that such restrictions are correlated with the general attitude toward
abortion in a state and measure both general climate effects as well as the
direct effects of the law. The effect of these restrictions on actual abortions
among state residents is much smaller, suggesting one of the main effects of34
these policies is to induce cross-state migration for abortionservices. We also
have substantial evidence that a greater number of abortion providersin a state
increases the abortion rate within the state, primarily through inducing cross-
state migration, with nonhospital providers being particularly important. Party
control in the state has mixed effects and is difficulttointerpret. The abortion
rate is also directly correlated with the unemployment rateand per capita
income, and negatively correlated with the black population shareand the
marriage a-ate.
VI
The Determinants of Abortion by A9e and Race
A.Teen versusNonteenAbortionRates
The CDC reports abortions for teens and nonteens for a selected sample
ofstates, as discussed in section 3 above.In this section we look at
differences in teen and nonteen abortion determinants. Because this data is
from a different source and is available only for a smaller sample, we want to
warn against drawing strong conclusions from these results.
Columns 1 and 2 of table 7 present estimates of teen and nonteen
abortion rates, using our standard specification, and based on the 555
observationsfrom the 45 states that ever report abortion numbers by age.
Using the CDC data, column 1 presents teen abortion determinants and column
2 presents nonteen abortion determinants.
The determinants of teen and nonteen abortion rates are generally similar
in columns I and 2. Most puzzling, while restrictions on teen abortions
significantly reduce the teen abortion rate within these states, they appear to35
reduce the nonteen abortion rate by almost as much.36 This suggests that
the passage of teen restrictions in these states is correlated with a growing
climate of hostility (or at least reluctance) toward abortion, in ways that is not
picked up. by other variables in the model. It is important to remember that
this variable does not necessarily indicate a decrease in the number of women
who have abortions, but only indicates that the number of women who have
abortions in this state declineswhenteenage restrictions are implemented.
Unfortunately, we have no information on teen abortions by state of residence.
Teen abortion rates appear as responsive to provider availability and
other climate variables as nonteen abortion rates. Both nonteens and teens
show declines in the abortion rate when the black population share grows.
Teen abortion rates are less responsive to unemployment rates than are nonteen
abortion rates. As with the aggregate CDC data in table 6, AFDC benefit
levels again appear important in these estimates.
We want to emphasize the problem of interpreting any of these
teen/nonteen comparisons, given the selected nature of the data. Only those
states that collect information on abortion by age are included in the sample;
one might believe that this is a group of states that is particularly aware of
problems and concerns regarding abortion among teenagers. The fact that
legal restrictions on teen abortions are significant in this group of states but not
in the full sample is evidence of this. Thus, it is difficult to generalize these
results to the aggregate U.S. population. A similar caveat applies to the
results on nonwhite and white abortion rates.
¼stimaxing the AG!dataon the same sampleofstates and years also results in a
aegative and significant coefficienton teenrestrictions,unlike the resultsforthe entire
sampleof states and years.36
B.Nonwhite versusWhiteAbortion Rates
For a selected group of states and years, CDC data is also available on
white and nonwhite abortions. Columns 3 and 4 of table 7 presents this data
in the same form as we presented the teen/nonteen data, for the 479
observations from 41 states that ever report abortion numbers by race.
The estimated determinants of abortion among white and nonwhite
women are generally similar in columns 3 and 4. Pàrhaps reflecting the
problems with CDC data, the impact of medicaid funding, restrictions is
insignificant for both groups,andeven appears positive for nonwhite women.
Althoughthe sampleselection results in different estimates than we find in a
full sample of the population, there is no evidence here of subEtantial




There are several limits to the data used in this paper that constrain out
analysis. In particular, we can look only at the impact of laws on aggregate
abortion rates. Since we have no information on the availability and use of
abortion by income level, we cannot investigate the effects of public funding
restrictions on abortion decisions across the income distribution, and separate
out these direct effects from larger climate changes that are correlated with
legal changes.
The largest caveat on these results is that our regressions only be
estimated on data through 1988, as a variety of our explanatory variables are
not available yet for later years. Since 1988, the political and policy landscape
for abortion has changed substantially. In particular, the rise of anti-abortion
protests, organized nationally and targeted at presumably vulnerable states and37
cities, may have substantially increased the role of "climate" in affecting both
provider availability and the willingness of women to seek abortions. In 1992,
the Supreme Court ruled that states could regulate the abortion process, as
long as they did not impose an undue burden on women seeking abortions.
Since then, a number of states have enacted or are discussing such provisions
as waiting periods. Empirical evidence of the impact of these actions and
laws, however, must await future data analysis.38
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Data Sources
Thisappendix lists sources of data used in this paper, and indicates any
adjustments to the data that were made.
Abortion Data
A.Alan Guttmacher Institute (AG!).
1. Total abortions by state and year. Available from 1973-1992,
with no data for 1983, 1986, 1989 and 1990. The data come from
regular surveys of abortion providers, conducted by AGI. Sources:
1973-1988 data from Henshaw and Van Vort (1992), Table 7;
199 1-1992 data from Henshaw and Van Von (1994).
2. Abortion providers by state and year.Available from
1973-1988, with no data for 1983 and 1986. Source: 1973-1988,
Henshaw and Van Von (1992), Table 11. Additional data on providers
by type were provided by Stanley Henshaw at AG!.
3. Abortion rates for state residents only, by state and year.
Available from 1978-1988, with no data for 1983 and 1986. These data
are constructed by AG! from various sources, described in the source.
Source: Henshaw and Van Von (1992), Table 9.
B.Center for Disease Control (CDC).
1. Total abortions by state and year. Available for rlected states
from 1973-1987, and all states far 1988-1990.The data are
predominantly based on reports by state health agencies to the CDC.
Source: 1973-1981 come from various issues Abortion Surveillance and
1982-1990 data are from issues of Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report.
2. Abortions ratesby age andby race, by state and year.
Available for selected states from 1973-1990, with substantial missing
data. The data come from reports by state health agencies to the CDC.
Same source as previous variable except 1982-1988 abortion by race data
were obtained directly from the CDC.
4142
U.Policy Data
1.Dummy variable on whether a state disallows medicaid
funding for abortions. Coded by the authors from a variety of sources
in different years. When information was not available, the authors
calledstateagencies and organizations to identi& whether restrictions
were in place in particular years. In years in which restrictions occurred
for only pad of the year, the share of the year in which the restrictions
were in place is coded.An extensivedescription ofthe data
determinationfor each state is available upon request.
2. Numbers of abortions paid for by public funds. Coded by the
authors from twoprimarysources of information. The Health Care
FinancingAgency (HCFA) reported data from 1976-1983onabortions
chargedby the statestothe federal government, not including state-
fundedabortions.AG! also publishes data, includingbothstateand
federal-fundedmedicaid abortions, for 1978, 1980, 1981, 1983, 1985,
1987, and 1990. We use the AG! data when available, and use the
HCFA data for 1979 and1982to makean informed interpolationfor
thesetwoyears.
3.Dummyvariable on whether a state imposes parental
notification or consent requirements on teen abortions. Data on
statelaws available in GreenbergerandConnor (1991). The variable is
coded from these data. A more extensive description of the data is
available upon request.
4.Dummy variable on whether physically bordering states
disallow medicaid funding for abortions. Weighted average of the
dummyvariableindicating medicaid funding restrictions in each
physicallycontiguous state, where weightsarethe inverse distances
betweenthestate capitalofthe ownstateandthestate capitalofeach
surroundingstate.
5. Dummy variable on whether physically bordering states
impose parental notification or consent requirements on teen
abortions. Weighted average of the dummy variable indicating teen
restrictions in each physically contiguous state,whereweights arethe
inverse distances between the state capital of the ownstate andthe state
capital of each surrounding state.43
6.AFDC caseload numbers. Available for 1973-1992. Data for
1973-1980fromvarious editions of PublicAssistance Statistics andthat
for 1981-1992 from various editions of The GreenBook.
7. AFDC maximum benefit levels. Available for 1973-1992.
Data for 1973-1980 from Characteristicsof StateAFDCPlans, various
years; 1981-1992 data from various editions of The GreenBoo/c
III.PoliticalClimate Data
1. Dummy variable for whether state has enacted restrictions
disallowing medicaid funding for abortions, which have been
enjoined by the courts due to their formulation. Coded byauthors
from a variety of sources in different years. Among all states which
have no medicaid funding restrictions in operation, this variable
distinguishes between those states which have passed legislation that
limits medicaid funding, but which has been enjoined by the courts. In
some cases, this has been intentional (i.e., at the time of passage, it was
clear the law would not be enforced), in other cases it was not clear
whether the courts would uphold the law or not. A more extensive
description of the data is available upon request.
2. Dummy variable for whether state governor is Republican.
Coded from information in various editions of TheBook of the States.
Where possible, we confirmed this information using American
Governors and Gubernatorial Elections, 1979-87.
3.Dummy variable for whether state senate is Republican-
controlled. Coded from information in various editions of TheBookof
the States. In years where there is an exact tie between the number of
Republican and Democratic senators, we code the variable 0.5.
4. Dummy variable for whether state house is Republican-
controlled. Same source as previous variable.
5. COPE rankings (AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education).
Available from 1973-1992 for all states except Washington, D.C.
Source: AlmanacofAmericanPolitics, variousyears.44
IV. Demographicand Economic Data
1. State population by year. Available for all years throughthe
CurrentPopulation Reports, P25series.
2. Female population, ages 15-44, ages 15-20 (teens), and
ages 31-44 (older women). From 1973-1979, total population by
state and age is available in CurrentPopulation Reports, P25series. We
calculate the female share by dividing the relevant age group in half.
From 1980-1992, total population by state and age and sex is available
in CurrentPopulation Reports, P25series.
3. Marriage rates per 1000 women. Available from VitalStatistics
for years 1973-1990.
4.Labor force participation of women. 1970 Census data
available; 1974-75 data available for some states; all states and years
available 1976-1992. We interpolate 1973 for all states, and 1974-75 for
states where the data are missing, using the 1970 data. Data in U.S.
Department of Labor, GeographicProfile of Employment and
Unemployment variouseditions.
5. Nonmetropolitan population.Population not residing in a
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, 1973-1979; population not
residing in a Metropolitan Statistical Area, 1980-1990. Data are
available for 1973-1978; 1980-1988; 1990.1979 and 1989 are
interpolated.
6. Unemployment rate by state and year. Available 1973-1992.
Published in Employmentand Earnings, variousyears.
7. Per capita income by state and year. Available 1973-1992.
Published in the Surveyof Current Business, variousyears.
8. Number of live births by state and year. Available 1973-1990.
Published in VitalStatistics, variousyears.
9. Number of blacks by state and year. Available 1973, 1975,
1976, 1980-1985, and 1988-1990. Missing years interpolated. Data
from the CurrentPopulation Reports, SeriesP23 (1973 and 1975),
Series P20 (1976), and Series P25 (1980 and forward).45
10.Number of physicians and number of obstetricians and
gynecologists, by state and year. Available 1974-1979, 1981-1984,
1986,1989-1992.Data arethenumberof non-Federal physicians (or
ob-gyn practitioners) in each state.Source: American Medical
Association, Physician Characteristics and Distribution in the U.S.,
various years.
11. Number of hospitals,by state and year. Available
1973-1992. Data are the total number of hospitals in each state.
Source: American Hospital Association, Hospital Statistics, various
years,table 10-B.Appendix Table 1
State Abortions and Abortion Rates, AGI and CDC Data
Ad: Average annual data by state, 1974-88, except 1983 and 1986
CDC: Average annual data by state, 1974-88, (or Cat.. with data in all years
AGIData CDCData













1 Alabama 15,994 17.5
2 Alaska 2,292 20.0 1,559 13.8
3 Arizona 15,688 23.7
4Arkansas 5,194 10.2 5,162 10.1
5 California 252,445 43.1 222,794 37.6
6 Colorado 20,397 27.3 14,355 19.3
7 Connecticut 19,157 26.3 15,764 21.7
8 Delaware 3,934 26.6
9 D.C. 28,387 165.2 25,210 146.5
10Florida 67,823 31.4 49,399 22.7
11 Georgia 34,563 25.4 32,022 23.6
12 Hawaii 8,715 37.1 5,693 24.5
13 Idaho 2,137 9.8
14 Illinois 67,015 25.3 62,437 23.6
15 Indiana 14,155 11.1 12,938 10.1
16 Iowa 8,418 13.1
17 Kansas 12,948 24.5 8,762 16.6
18 Kentucky 10,751 12.3 7,998 9.3
19 Louisiana 15,738 15.4 13,451 13.0
20 Maine 4,366 16.8
21 Maryland 28,277 26.8 23,644 22.5
22 Massachusetts39,766 29.1 36,958 27.0
23 Michigan 58,706 27.2
24 Minnesota 17,262 18.1 16,294 17.0
25 Mississippi 4,287 7.3 3,863 6.6
26 Missouri 17,673 15.7 16,484 14.7

















28 Nebraska 5,698 16.8 5,123 14.4
29 Nevada 7,724 37.7 5,420 26.8
30 New Hampshire4,543 19.8 3,186 3.8
31 New Jersey 53,838 31.2
32 New Mexico 6,392 20.4
33 New York 183,787 44.5 153,292 37.2
34 North Carolina30,804 21.6 29,614 20.8
35 North Dakota 2,381 16.0 2,275 15.3
36 Ohio 55,591 22.3
37 Oklahoma 10,705 15.2
38 Oregon 15,213 25.3 12,637 21.0
39 Pennsylvania 58,266 22.0 55,524 21.0
40 Rhode Island 6,095 27.6 6,043 27.3
41 South Carolina11,482 14.8 10,390 13.4
42 South Dakota 1,464 9.7 1,412 9.4
43 Tennessee 23,118 21.5 19,212 17.7
44 Texas 88,050 24.9
45 Utah 3,730 10.7 3,554 10.2
46 Vermont 3,228 26.0 2,949 23.7
47 Virginia 30,494 22.8 28,932 21.6
48 Washington 30,354 31.1 27,275 28.0
49 West Virginia 2,811 6.5
50 Wisconsin 17,623 16.4
51 Wyoming 852 7.8Appendix Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables
Across State-YearObservations







State ofoccurrence (AOl)650 26.8 13.5 13.5
State of residence (AOL) 450 28.1 10.4 12.7
State of occurrence (CDC) 722 22.9 12.0 11.1
Teen (CDC) 555 28.2 14.0 13.2
Nonteen (CDC) 555 20.9 11.8 11.0
White (CDC) 474 17.9 13.5 12.7
Nonwhite (CDC) 474 69.3 86.5 74.4
2. PolicyVariables
Medicaidfunding 750 .428 .478 .344
disallowed? (1 =yes)
Teen restrictions? 750 .088 .283 .189
(1 =yes)
Border states' policy: 750 .549 .350 .196
Medicaid disallowed?'1
Border states policy: 750 .111 .184 .095
Teen restrictions?"
Numbers of publicly 356 13,69527,966 28,773
funded abortions
AFDC Casetoad per 750 6.6 2.3 1.9
1000 women
Maximum AFDC benefits750 373.5 160.7 140.4
3.Climate Variables
Unenforcedrestrictions 750 .222 .416 .269
onmedicaid? (1 =yes)
Governor/House/senate 750 .048 .213 .134
all Republican? (1=yes)
Governor/House/Sete 750 .433 •.496 .328
all Democratic? (1=yes)
Governor GOP? (1=yes)750 .388 .487 .265
House GOP? (1=yes) 750 .129 .334 .250
Senate GOP? (1=yes) 750 .240 .425 .358












4. Provider Variables (in1000.)
Total providers 650 132 165 162
Hospital providers 650 74 100 tOO
Nonhospital providers 650 58 73 63
5. Demographic/Economic Variables
Marriage rate/l000 women 750 10.3
Percentage teens (15.20/'750 23.1







Percentage black' 750 11.9 8.2 8.3
Percentage in non- 750 24.2 17.5 17.6
metropolitan areat
Labor force participation 750 51.9 4.9 3.5
rate among women
Per-capita income 750 15,276 2,509 1,898
Unemployment rate 750 7.3 2.1 1.2
All datais weighted by state femalefertile population.
°Averagepolicy in surrounding states, weighted by distance. See text.
bAmong all fertile women.
Cwithin the total population.Appendix Table 3
First Stage Regression for TSLS Specification
DependentVariable: log(abortion providers)
1.lnstnam.nts for ProviderVariable
Log(nuniber of hospitals) .477"
(.204)
Log(number of physicians) .77C
(.201)
2. Policy Variable.
Medicaid funding disallowed? (Iyes) .036
(.029)
Teen restrictions? (1 =yes) .081"
(.031)
Borderstates' policy:Medicaid disallowed? -.153"
(.047)
Border states' policy: teen restrictions? -.013
(.053)
Log(AFDCmaximum benefit levels) .022
(.067)
3. Climate Variables
Unenforcedrestrictions onMedicaid? (I—yes) .068"
(.025)
Governor/House/Senate all Republican? (I =yes) .055
(.034)











Percentage in nonmetropolitan areas .003
(.003)








Standarddeviations in parentheses; Significanzat 5% level; "Significaniat1% level.
Regressionincludesa full set of state and year effectsand is run onan identical ample
describedfor the results in column I, table 1.Table 1
Determinants of Abortions Rates
1974-88 within 50 Statesa
Difference













(lyes) (.041) (.049) (.039)(.021)(.018)(.012)
Border states' policy:.203° .082'.199° -.03 1-.017.084°
Medicaid disallowed? (.058) (.049)(.056)(.047) (.039)(.027)
Borderstates policy:-.023 -.170' -.025-.017-.026 .018




Unenforcedrestrictions-.069' -.111" -.066'.051 .021-.039'
on medicaid? (lryes) (.034)(.032)(.031)(.037)(.020)(.021)
(]ovemorfHouse/Senatc.013-.094'.017-.021-.043'.011















TSLS TSLS TSLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
4.Demographic/EconomiC
Variables
Marriage ratc/ -.012'.004' -.012" -.002-.0004 .002
1000 women (.005) (.002) (.005)(.004)(.003)(.002)
Percentageteens .006.009.006 .005.007" -.003
(.007)(.007)(.007)(.004)(.003)(.002)
Percentage older .014-.040'.013 .010.016".003
(ages 35-44) (.011)(.010)(.011)(.008)(.005)(.005)
Percentage black -.osC' .009' -.058".010-.004 .007
(.023)(.002)(.022)(.021)(.014)(.012)
Percentage in non- -.0001 -.009" -.0002.004 .001 .002
metropolitan areas (.004) (.001)(.004)(.004)(.003)(.002)
Labor force participation -.010 .017" ..011 -.003-.001 -.001
rate among women (.007)(.004)(.007)(.005)(.004)(.003)




Statceffects YesNo Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yeareffects Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
k-squared .899 .708 .899 .960 .973 .896
Numberof observations650 650 650 450 450 450
Standarddeviations inparentheses;
'Significantat 5% level; "Significantat 1% level.
Ncbraska is omitted from all models (ace text); D.C. is included.
1. 2, 4 and 6 instrument this variable, as discussed in the text.Table 2




Base calculation: () (2)
Abortion rate for a state
without restriction? 26.13 26.92
Own state imposes medicaid
restrictions only 22.63 25.64
(Percentage change from base)(-13.4) (-4.8)
Own state imposes teen restrictions
only 27.37 6.29
(Percentage change from base) (4.7) (-2.3)
No own-state restrictions, one
additional border state imposes
restrictions 27.49 26.71
(Percentage change from base) (5.2) (-.78)
Own state enacts medicaid
restrictions that are enjoined
by the courts 24.38 28.34
(Percentage change from base) (-6.7) (5.3)
No own-state restrictions, provider
numbers increase by 10 percent
within the state 27.61 26.20
(Percentage change from base) (5.7) (-2.7)
4Calculated at means of all variables, except setting medicaid restrictions =0;
teen restrictions =0;and unenforced restrictions on medicaid =0.Column 1
estimates based on coefficients from regression shown in column 1, table 1;
Column 2 estimates based on coefficients from regression shown in column 4,
table 1.
All estimates use the smearing technique to transform estimated log abortion
rates into actual abortion rates (Duan, 1983).Table 3
The Effect of Medicaid Restrictions on Abortion Rates.
Various Specifications. 1974-88
Dependentvariablelog(abortion rate by state of occurrence)
Full SampleRestrictedSampleFull Sample





































































Standard errors in parentheses;
'Significant at 5% level; "Sfitat 1% level.
Allregressionsare basedon TSLSestimates, includingstate and year effects, as
well as the entire set of independent variables shown in table 1: teen restrictions,
borderstates'teen restrictions, log(AFDC benefits), Cov/}iouse/Sen all Republican,
GovfHouse/Senall Democratic, log(total providers), marriage rateIl000 women,
percentage teen,percentageolder, percentageblack,percentagein nonznctropolitan
areas, labor force participationrates among women, log(per-capitaincome), and
unemployment rates.Table 4
The Effect of Provider Availability on Abortion Rates,
Various Specifications. 1974-88
Dependent variablelog(abortionrateby stateof occurrence)





Log(nonhospital providers) — .5631*
(.156)
Log(hospital providers) — — -.011
(.384)
—
Percentage of total providers

















Allregressions are based on TSLS estimates,includingstate and year effects,
as well as the entire set of independent variables listed in table 1: medicaid
funding disallowed, teen restrictions, border states' medicaid funding limits,
border states' teen restrictions, log(AFDC benefits), unenforced restrictions on
medicaid, Gov/House/Sen all Republican, Gov!House/Sen all Democratic,
marriagerate/1000 women, percentageteen, percentage older, percentage
black, percentage in nonmetropolitanareas, labor force participation rates
among women, log(per-capitaincome), andunemploymentrates.Table 5
The Effect of State Party Affiliation on Abortion Rates,
Various Specifications, 197488




Values Over the Using
CurrentValues






















































Standard errors in parentheses;
Significantat 5% Level; "Significantat 1% level.
°Wc lose three observations from Minnesota in the four-year lag, since prior to 1973
Minnesota's legislature was nonpartisan.
bCOPE ratings do not include D.C.
All regressions are based on TSLS estimates, including state and year effects, as well as
the entire set of independent variables listed in table I: Medicaid funding disallowed,
teen restrictions, border states' Medicaid funding limits, border fls' teen restrictions,
Iog(AFDC benefits), unenforced restrictions on Medicaid, log(total providers), marriage
rate/WOO women, percentageteen,percentage older, percentage black, percentage in
nonmetropolitan areas, labor force participation rates among women, log(per-capita
income), andunemploymentrates.Table 6
Determinants of Abortions Rates, Various Data Samples





All 1974- 1981- Data CDC
Years 1980 1988 Sample
(4)
Data
(5) (I) (2) (3)
1. Policy Variables
Màdicaid fundinj -.144"-.131 -.193" -.060' .014
disallowed?(Itycs) (.038) (.068) (.077) (.034) (.050)
Teenrestrictions? .046 -.134 .017 .031 .013
(1 =yes) (.04!) (.139) (.111) (.034) (.050)
Border states' policy: .203" .164 -.029 .228" .309"
Medicaid disallowed? (.058) (.101) (.129) (.050) (.074)
Borderstates' policy: -.023 -.313 -.042 -.003 -.09!
Teenrestrictions? (.066) (.3 16) (.070) (.054) (.079)
Log(AFDCmaximum -.029 -.018 -.169 .145 .298"
benefit levels) (.085) (.165) (.136) (.073) (.107)
2. Clirnats Variables
Unenforcedrestrictions -.069' -.ioC -.075 -.035 .013
on Medicaid? (1 =yes) (.034) (.054) (.062) (.030) (.044)
Governor/}{ouse/Senatc .013 .090 -.052 .031 .014
all Republican?(I=yes)(.046) (.075) (.088) (.039) (.057)
Governor/House/Senate -.018 -.004 -.017 -.033 -.093"
alt Democratic? (1 =yes)(.022) (.054) (.057) (.0 18) (.026)
3. Provider Variable
Log(total providers)1' .578".715" .722 .544" 1.077"





Data CDC All 1974- 1981-
Years 1980 1988 Sample
(4)
Data
(5) (I) (2) (3)
4. Demographic/Economic
Variables
Marriage rate/l000women-.012 -.029" .001 -.011" -.006
(.005) (.012) (.025) (.004) (.006)
Percentage teens .006 .009 -.008 .005 .005
(.007) (.012) (.052) (.006) (.008)
Percentageolder .014 .035 .003 .02f
(ages35-44) (.011) (.019) (.017) (.010) (.015)
Percentage black -.058"-202" -.031 -.030 -.086"
(.023) (.061) (.051) (.019) (.028)
Percentage in nonmetropolitan-.000I -.001 -.019 -.003 -.002
areas (.004) (.008) (.045) (.004) (.005)
Laborforce participation -.0 10 .003 -.003 -.0 if -.022
rate among women (.007) (.013) (.006) (.006) (.009)
Log(per-capitaincome) .684 .400 .117 .491 .121
(.332) (.815) (.408) (.268) (.394)
Unemploymentraze .035".03C .010 .02C .02f
(.009) (.016) (.014) (.007) (.011)
k-squared .899 .909 .968 .923 .849
Numberof observations 650 350 300 622 622
Standard deviation. in parentheses;
Significantax5%level; "Significantat 1% level.
All regressions include a full set of state and year effects.Table 7
Determinants of Abortion Rates by Age and Race




(1) (2) (3) (4)
1.Policy Variables
Medicaidfunding -.031 -.053 -.006 .028
disallowed? (1 =ycs) (.061) (.062) (.084) (.074)
Teen restrictions? -.132" -.160' -.007 -.112
(l=yes) (.073) (.075) (.103) (.091)
• 'S 5* Border states policy: .370 .333 .458 .403
Medicaid disallowed? (.081) (.083) (.137) (.120)
Border states' policy: .098 .226' .057 .423'
Teenrestrictions? (.100) (.102) (.250) (.221)
Log(AFDC maximum .410' .421" .481" .577"
bcneflt lcveJE) (.136) (.139) (.198) (.174)
2. Climate Variables
Unenforcedrestrictions -.072 -.078 .043 .006
on Medicaid? (I —yes) (.055) (.056) (.070) (.062)
Governor/House/Senate -.023 -.013 .095 -.012
all Republican? (lsyes) (.066) (.068) (.100) (.088)
.5 5• 5 Governor/House/Senate -.118 -.091 -.059 -.081
all Democratic?(1—yes) (.036) (.036) (.042) (.037)
3. ProvIder Variables
L.og(total providers) 1.343"1.452" .860"1.398"




(I) (2) (3) (4)
4.DemographIc/Economic
Variables
Marriagerate/I000 women -.004 .0003 .006 .003
(.006) (.006) (.008) (.007)
Percentage teens — •.02f -.02C
(.013) (.011)
Percentage older — -.011 -.010
(ages 35-44) (.025) (.022)
Percentage black -.122"-.096"
(.030) (.030)
Percentage in nonmetropolitan areas -.0001 -.002 .014 .005
(.006) (.006) (.009) (.008)
Labor force participation -.016 -.003 -.018 -.012
rate among women (.010) (.010) (.012) (.011)
Log(per-capita income) .283 .434 1 .569 -.949
(.526) (.538) (.868) (.765)
S •5 •
Unemploymentrate .030 .049 .045 .034
(.013) (.013) (.017) (.015)
R-squared .833 .828 .909 .797
Numberof observations 555 555 474 474
Standarddeviations in parentheses;
Signiflcantat 5% level;"Significantat1% level.
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Notethat years 1983, 19R6. 1989 and 19O are missing in the AOl dats and are smoothed (or the purpose o( this graph.
















Abortion Rates by State of Occurrence
and State of Residence
Note that years 1983, 1286, 1989 and 1990 are missing in the dala and arc smoothed [or thepurpose of this graph. Weights arc based on
the female fertile population in each slate.



















AbortionRates by Age Group
WeightedAverage over 24 and 51 States
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